Software implementation of pairings at the 128-bit security level

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Overview

Optimization and protocol issues for pairings over supersingular curves, in particular for the genus-2 case.

1. Structure of pairings over (hyper)elliptic curves.
2. Eta pairing.
3. Hardware characteristic 2 multiplier. Parallelization for a single paring.
4. Genus-2 supersingular curve.
5. BLS signature scheme with the genus-2 curve.

Pairings from Elliptic Curves

Let E be an elliptic curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$.

- Let $n \approx q$ be a prime divisor of $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ with $\gcd(n, q) = 1$.
- Let k be the smallest positive integer with $n \mid q^k - 1$, and suppose that $k > 1$. Then $E[n] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k})$.
- Let $\mathbb{G}_T$ be the order-n subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}^*$.

The (reduced/restricted) Tate pairing is

$$t : E(\mathbb{F}_q)[n] \times E[n] \to \mathbb{G}_T$$

defined by

$$t(P, Q) = f_{n,P}(Q)^{(q^k-1)/n}$$

where $f_{n,P}$ is a *Miller function* with divisor $n(P) - n(\infty)$.

Miller's Algorithm for Computing $t(P, Q)$

Let $n = \sum_{i=0}^{d} n_i 2^i$.

1. Set $f \leftarrow 1$, $R \leftarrow P$.
2. For i from d down to 0 do:
   - 2.1 Let ℓ be the tangent line through R, and let v be the vertical line through $2R$.
   - 2.2 $R \leftarrow 2R$.
   - 2.3 $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell(Q)/v(Q)$.
   - 2.4 If $n_i = 1$ then
     - 2.4.1 Let ℓ be the line through R and P and let v be the vertical line through $R + P$.
     - 2.4.2 $R \leftarrow R + P$.
     - 2.4.3 $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell(Q)/v(Q)$.
3. Return $f^{(q^k-1)/n}$.

Optimizations

1. Improve the arithmetic in the main loop. Parallelize.
2. Reduce the number of iterations.
3. Improve the arithmetic in the final exponentiation.

Symmetric Pairings

Let $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2 = E(\mathbb{F}_q)[n]$.

- Let Φ be an endomorphism on E with $\Phi(\mathbb{G}_1) \neq \mathbb{G}_1$.
- $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \to \mathbb{G}_T$ defined by

$$e(P, Q) = t(P, \Phi(Q))$$

is a symmetric (Type 1) pairing.

Most pairing-based protocols can be implemented with symmetric pairings. For the 128-bit security level:

k	Curve	Bitlength of $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}$
2	$Y^2 = X^3 + aX/\mathbb{F}_{p1536}$	3072
4	$Y^2 + Y = X^3 + X/\mathbb{F}_{2^{1223}}$	4892
6	$Y^2 = X^3 - X + 1/\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$	4840

Eta Pairing ($k = 4$)

[Barreto, Galbraith, Ó' hÉigeartaigh, Scott]

$$E/\mathbb{F}_2 : Y^2 + Y = X^3 + X$$
$$N = \#E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m}) = 2^m - 2^{(m+1)/2} + 1, \quad m \equiv 3 \pmod 8.$$

- Doubling is cheap: $[2](x, y) = (x^2, y^2 + 1)$.
- Distortion map:

$$\mathbb{F}_{2^{2m}} = \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[u]/(u^2 + u + 1), \quad \mathbb{F}_{2^{4m}} = \mathbb{F}_{2^{2m}}[v]/(v^2 + v + u)$$
$$\Phi(x, y) = (x + u^2, y + ux + v).$$

- Pairing: Let $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})$. Then

$$\eta(P, Q) = f_{T,P}(\Phi(Q))^M$$

where

$$T = 2^{(m+1)/2}$$
$$M = (2^{4m} - 1)/N = (2^m + 2^{(m+1)/2} + 1)(2^{2m} - 1)$$

- $\eta(P, Q)$ is a fixed power of the Tate pairing.

Computing $\eta(P, Q)$

Input: $P = (x_1, y_1), Q = (x_2, y_2) \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})$.

1. $z \leftarrow x_1 + 1$.
2. $f \leftarrow z \cdot (x_1 + x_2 + 1) + y_1 + y_2 + (z + x_2)u + v$.
3. For i from 1 to $(m + 1)/2$ do:
   - 3.1 $z \leftarrow x_1$, $x_1 \leftarrow \sqrt{x_1}$, $y_1 \leftarrow \sqrt{y_1}$.
   - 3.2 $g \leftarrow z \cdot (x_1 + x_2) + y_1 + y_2 + x_1 + 1 + (z + x_2)u + v$.
   - 3.3 $f \leftarrow f \cdot g$.
   - 3.4 $x_2 \leftarrow x_2^2$, $y_2 \leftarrow y_2^2$.
4. Return $f^{(2^{2m}-1)(2^m - 2^{(m+1)/2}+1)}$.

Cost estimate: $7 \cdot (m + 1)/2$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$.

Genus-2 Supersingular Curve

[Barreto, Galbraith, Ó' hÉigeartaigh, Scott]

$$C/\mathbb{F}_2 : Y^2 + Y = X^5 + X^3 + b.$$

- Degree zero divisor class group $J_C(\mathbb{F}_q)$, $q = 2^m$.
- Reduced divisors:
  Degenerate: $(P) - (\infty)$, $P \in C(\mathbb{F}_q)$.
  Non-degenerate: $(P_1) + (P_2) - 2(\infty)$
  - Type A: $P_1, P_2 \in C(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus \{\infty\}$.
  - Type B: $P_1 \in C(\mathbb{F}_{q^2}) \setminus C(\mathbb{F}_q)$, $P_2 = \pi(P_1)$.
- Mumford rep: $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[z]$, $\deg(b) < deg(a) \leq 2$.
- $\#J_C(\mathbb{F}_q) \approx q^2$.
- Embedding degree is $k = 12$ ($\#J_C(\mathbb{F}_{q^2}) \mid q^{12} - 1$).

Symmetric Pairings

For the 128-bit security level:

k	Curve	Bitlength of $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}$
2	$Y^2 = X^3 + aX/\mathbb{F}_{p1536}$	3072
4	$Y^2 + Y = X^3 + X/\mathbb{F}_{2^{1223}}$	4892
6	$Y^2 = X^3 - X + 1/\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$	4840
12	$Y^2 + Y = X^5 + X^3/\mathbb{F}_{2^{439}}$	5268

$k = 12$ gives relatively small base field.

Eta Pairing on Degenerate Divisors

- Octupling is cheap: If $P = (x, y) \in C(\mathbb{F}_q)$, then

$$8((P) - (\infty)) = (P') - (\infty)$$

  where $P' = (x^{64} + 1, y^{64} + x^{128} + 1)$.

- Eta pairing: $D_i = (P_i) - (\infty)$. $\eta(D_1, D_2)$ is a fixed power of the Tate pairing.
- Cost estimate: $69 \cdot (m-1)/2$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$.

Eta Pairing on General Divisors

1. If D_1 is degenerate and $D_2 = (P_1) + (P_2) - 2(\infty)$ is Type A non-degenerate, then

$$\eta(D_1, D_2) = \eta(D_1, (P_1) - (\infty)) \cdot \eta(D_1, (P_2) - (\infty)).$$

2. If D_1 is degenerate (and fixed) and D_2 is Type B non-degenerate, then find a (small) integer c such that $D_2' = D_2 + cD_1$ is Type A. Then

$$\eta(D_1, D_2) = \eta(D_1, D_2')/\eta(D_1, D_1)^c.$$

   (1 and 2 not necessarily fastest [Aranha, Beuchat, Detrey, Estibals], but can use common code.)
3. For the general case, Lee & Lee give an alg for $\eta(D_1, D_2)$ using resultant. Cost estimate from mult counts gives factor 4 over degenerate-degenerate case.

Timings

[Barreto, Galbraith, Ó' hÉigeartaigh, Scott, 2007]

Timings (in milliseconds) for the eta pairing at the "1230-bit security level" on a 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4:

Curve	Pairing
$E(\mathbb{F}_{2^{307}})$	3.50
$E(\mathbb{F}_{3^{127}})$	5.36
$C(\mathbb{F}_{2^{103}})$ degenerate	1.87
$C(\mathbb{F}_{2^{103}})$ non-degenerate	6.42

Multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{103}}$ exploited 128-bit SIMD registers. Other fields used only 32-bit registers.

Timings at 128-bit security level

Timings (in clock cycles) for the eta pairing at the 128-bit security level on an Intel Core2.

Curve	Number of field mults	Pairing (10^6 cycles)
$E/\mathbb{F}_{2^{1223}}$	4,284	19.0
$E/\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$	3,570	15.8
$C/\mathbb{F}_{2^{439}}$ (degenerate divisors)	15,111	16.4
$E/\mathbb{F}_{p_{256}}$ (BN[a])	15,093	10
$E/\mathbb{F}_{p_{256}}$ (BN[b])		4.5
$E/\mathbb{F}_{p_{256}}$ (BN[c])	12,785	3.3

[a] R-ate via MIRACL, 2008
[b] Naehrig, Niederhagen, Schwabe
[c] Beuchat, Diaz, Mitsunari, Okamoto, Rodríguez-Henríquez, Teruya

Beneath the timings

Times suggested that genus-2 with the anticipated hardware char 2 multiplier would be competitive with BN[a].

- Naehrig, Niederhagen, Schwabe (BN[b]) used an elegant (redundant) field rep with floating-point arithmetic.
  - SIMD can do 2 floating-point mult simultaneously.
  - ...but operand size is limited by 53-bit mantissa while integer multiplier is relatively fast on 64-bit operands.
  - Bernstein: floating-point on Pentium for point mult on NIST curves. 80-bit regs rather than SIMD. Integer mult is 32-bit.

  So Naehrig et al. seemed surprisingly fast.
- Beuchat et al. (BN[c]): faster times with alg improvements and faster mult with integer multiplier.
  Overhead BN[a] was more than suspected.

Approaches may find application across hardware.

Developments favoring small characteristic

Hardware char 2 multiplier (Intel Core i5, 2009) Pre-release speculation: should give factor > 2 accel in field mult against methods relying on lookup with a few bits.

- Gueron and Kounavis [2008], estimates for point mult on NIST random curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$ (B-233):

Method	acceleration
OpenSSL	0.57X
OpenSSL with enhancements	1X
...and 9-clock HW multiplier	12X
...and 3-clock HW multiplier	37X

- Aranha, Rodríguez-Henríquez [2010] with the real thing:

Accel for NIST random curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$	
Field multiplication	2.1X
Point multiplication	1.7X

Hardware char 2 multiplier (2/2)

Why isn't actual $\approx$ predicted?

1. OpenSSL in the 2008 estimates not written for speed records. Need comparisons against fast versions using 64- or 128-bit registers.
2. L-D "comb" commonly used for field mult is quite good in the 128-bit registers.

   Sanity test: if mult in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$ is charged as 16 polynomial mult of 64-bit operands, then comb with 128-bit registers is *15 cycles* per such op.

   Can't expect the acceleration factors from [GK, 2008].
3. [Fog] HW multiplier: throughput 1/8, latency 12. (Appears perfect scheduling can do better.) Charged as in item 2, $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$ mul is *7 cycles* each.

   (Karatsuba appears effective even at this field size, and the experiments have 9 HW muls. Regardless, L-D times mean HW won't reach GK estimates.)

Parallelization

Pairing finds Miller function $f_{r,P}$. Strategy to apply multiple cores:

1. Write $r = 2^w r_1 + r_0$ for some w.
2. Let $\ell_{P,Q}$ be line through P and Q and v_P be vertical line through P. Then

$$f_{r,P} = f_{2^w r_1 + r_0, P} = f_{2^w r_1, P} \cdot f_{r_0, P} \cdot \frac{\ell_{2^w r_1 P, r_0 P}}{v_{rP}}.$$

3. Can evaluate $f_{2^w r_1, P}$ as

$$f_{r_1,P}^{2^w} \cdot f_{2^w, r_1 P} \quad \text{or} \quad f_{2^w,P}^{r_1} \cdot f_{r_1, 2^w P}$$

depending on curve, embedding degree, weight of r,...

4. For our case, r_0 is small and $f_{r,P}$ is approx two half-length Miller function calculations.
5. Can apply recursively to exploit more processors.

Parallelization of the η_T pairing

INPUT: $P = (x_P, y_P), Q = (x_Q, y_Q) \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m}[r])$, starting point w_i for processor i.
OUTPUT: $\eta_T(P, Q) \in \mathbb{F}^*_{2^{4m}}$.

1: **parallel section**(processor i)
2: Initialize F_i
3: $x_{Q\,i} \leftarrow (x_Q)^{2^{w_i}}$, $y_{Q\,i} \leftarrow (y_Q)^{2^{w_i}}$
4: $x_{P\,i} \leftarrow (x_P)^{\frac{1}{2^{w_i}}}$, $y_{P\,i} \leftarrow (y_P)^{\frac{1}{2^{w_i}}}$
5: **for** $j \leftarrow w_i$ **to** $w_{i+1} - 1$ **do**
6: $\quad x_{P\,i} \leftarrow \sqrt{x_{P\,i}}, y_{P\,i} \leftarrow \sqrt{y_{P\,i}}, x_{Q\,i} \leftarrow x_{Q\,i}^2, y_{Q\,i} \leftarrow y_{Q\,i}^2$
7: $\quad u_i \leftarrow x_{P\,i} + \alpha, v_i \leftarrow x_{Q\,i} + \alpha$
8: $\quad g_{0\,i} \leftarrow u_i \cdot v_i + y_{P\,i} + y_{Q\,i} + \beta$, $g_{1\,i} \leftarrow u_i + x_{Q\,i}$
9: $\quad F_i \leftarrow F_i \cdot (g_{0\,i} + g_{1\,i} s + t)$
10: **end for**
11: $F \leftarrow \prod_{i=0}^{\pi} F_i$
12: **end parallel**
13: **return** $F^{(2^{2m}-1)(2^m+1\pm 2^{(m+1)/2})}$.

Acceleration for supersingular curve

Pairing with EC over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{1223}}$ (128-bit security level), estimated and experimental on Core 2 (45nm) and Core i5.

	Number of processors			
	1	2	4	8
Estimated accel factor		1.9	3.5	5.8
Core2 time (10^6 cycles)	17.4	9.3	5.1	3.0
Acceleration factor		1.9	3.4	5.8
Core i5 time (10^6 cycles)	7.5	4.3	2.5*	1.7*
Acceleration factor		1.7	3.0	4.5

*Estimate from per-thread data.

- Experimental is close to estimated.
- Thread synchronization (via OpenMP) cost small.
- Parallelization overhead increases with number of processors.

Parallelization for asymmetric pairings

Technique is not specific to symmetric pairings. But:

- r_0 not so small, exponentiation by 2^w not negligible.
- Final exponentiation is a larger portion of pairing cost.

Grabher, Großschädl, Page [2008] obtain factor 1.6 accel for 2 cores on a BN curve.

- OpenMP used to parallelize $\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}$ arithmetic and for simultaneous $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ ops.
- ...but single-thread times are $>$ 4X slower than BN^b, BN^c.
- A little help: Aranha, Karabina, Longa, Gebotys, López reduce cost of squarings in final exponentiation.

More opportunities if parallelization could be applied lower.

- OpenMP can have 3000-cycle sync on basic use.
- 1000 cycles with POSIX threads and spinlocks.
- ...but $\mathbb{F}_p$ multiplication is in hundreds of cycles.

Who wins the speed record?

If the question is "what's the fastest single pairing" then supersingular curves over char 2 fields appear to use multiple cores more efficiently and data suggests competitive with BN curves if given enough cores and hardware multiplier.

But...is multi-core parallelism applied to a single pairing useful?

- Probably not where these processors are targeted.
- Application: weak device with multi-thread capability.

What about genus-2?

Embedding degree 12 can mean parameter-size advantages. Times for particular implementation here are not compelling.

- Aranha, Beuchat, Detrey, Estibals cut Miller loop by 1/3.
- Pairing at security level corresponding to field size of 367 (rather than 439) bits on Core 2 and Core i5 (using hardware multiplier):

Pairing	Core 2	Core i5
Degenerate	5.0	2.5
Mixed	9.3	4.5
General	18.4	8.6

Units: 10^6 cycles

- The competition: Aranha, Rodríguez-Henríquez report BN times of 1.7–2.3 on this platform (128-bit security level).

Pairings for genus-2, especially on degenerate divisors, interesting again.

Arranging for degenerate divisors

BGOS remarked that parameters can be chosen in BF-IBE so that encryption is on degenerate divisors.

- Degenerate is important for speed.
- But...the security argument in the EC setting does not carry [CHM, 2010].

We illustrate security argument for Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures.

Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) Signatures

Let $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be a symmetric pairing, and let P be a fixed generator of $\mathbb{G}$.

1. Key generation for Alice:
   - Private key: $x \in_R [1, n-1]$; Public key: $X = xP$.
2. Signature generation. To sign M, Alice does:
   - Compute $Q = H(M)$, where $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{G}$.
   - Compute $S = xQ$.

   Alice's signature on M is S.
3. Signature verification. To verify (M, S), Bob does:
   - Compute $Q = H(M)$.
   - Accept iff $e(P, S) = e(Q, X)$.

Correctness:

$$e(P, S) = e(P, xQ) = e(xP, Q) = e(X, Q) = e(Q, X).$$

BLS Security

DHP Given $X = xP$ and Q, compute xQ.

Claim If DHP in $\mathbb{G}$ is hard and H is a random function, then the BLS signature scheme is secure.

Security argument Given a DHP instance (X, Q):

1. Set challenge public key as X and run BLS forger A.
2. Respond to hash queries $H(M)$ made by A, except for a randomly chosen distinguished query, by selecting $a \in_R [0, n)$ and setting $H(M) = aP$; the response to the distinguished hash query is $H(M^*) = Q$.
3. Respond to signing queries $M \neq M^*$ by setting $S = aX$.
4. If A eventually produces a forged signature S^* on M^*, then we have successfully obtained the solution S^* to the DHP instance (X, Q)

BLS-2

Let $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be the genus-2 pairing. Let $\mathcal{D}$ denote the set of degenerate divisors in $\mathbb{G}$, and let $\mathcal{P} \in \mathcal{D}$.

1. Key generation. Alice does:
   - Private key: $x \in_R [1, n)$; Public key: $X = x\mathcal{P}$.
2. Signature generation. To sign M, Alice does:
   - Compute $\mathcal{Q} = H(M)$, where $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{D}$.
   - Compute $S = x\mathcal{Q}$.

   Alice's signature on M is S.
3. Signature verification. To verify (M, S), Bob does:
   - Compute $\mathcal{Q} = H(M)$.
   - Accept iff $e(\mathcal{P}, S) = e(\mathcal{Q}, X)$.

DHP*: Given $X = x\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, compute $x\mathcal{Q}$.

DHP versus DHP*

Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a fixed generator of G.

DHP: Given $X = x\mathcal{P}$ and Q, compute xQ.

DHP*: Given $X = x\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, compute $x\mathcal{Q}$.

DHP and DHP* are computationally equivalent.

Degeneracy-Preserving Multipliers Let $\mathcal{P}$ be an order-n degenerate divisor.

$$\text{DPM} = \{a \in [0, n) : a\mathcal{P} \text{ is degenerate}\}.$$

$8^i\mathcal{P}$ is degenerate. Since $8^{4m} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, there are exactly $4m$ degenerate divisors of this form.

Question: Can one efficiently select $a \in_R$ DPM?

BLS-2 Security

DHP*: Given $X = x\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, compute $x\mathcal{Q}$.

Claim Suppose that one can efficiently select $a \in_R$ DPM. If DHP* in $\mathbb{G}$ is hard and H is a random function, then the BLS-2 signature scheme is secure.

Security argument Given DHP* instance $(X, \mathcal{Q})$:

1. Set the challenge public key as X and run A.
2. Respond to hash queries $H(M)$ made by A, except for a randomly chosen distinguished query, by selecting $a \in_R$ DPM and setting $H(M) = a\mathcal{P}$; the response to the distinguished query is $H(M^*) = \mathcal{Q}$.
3. Respond to signing queries $M \neq M^*$ with $S = aX$.
4. If A eventually produces a forged signature S^* on M^*, then we have obtained the solution S^* to the DHP* instance $(X, \mathcal{Q})$.

BLS-2 Security

Perhaps: introduce a new problem to circumvent issue with security argument.

DHP$^*_O$: Given $X = x\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, plus an oracle which returns random pairs $(\mathcal{R}, x\mathcal{R})$, compute $x\mathcal{Q}$.

Claim: If DHP$^*_O$ in $\mathbb{G}$ is hard and H is a random function, then the BLS-2 signature scheme is secure.

But...assumption that DHP$^*_O$ is hard is rephrasing of the assertion that it is hard to forge signature.

BLS-3: Choose only the parameter $\mathcal{P}$ to be degenerate. Verification: $e(\mathcal{P}, S) = e(Q, X)$.

Claim: BLS-3 is secure if DHP is hard and H is a random function.

Summary for genus-2

In most favorable case (BLS-2), verification is $e(\mathcal{P}, S) = e(\mathcal{Q}, X)$ with $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ degenerate.

- Estimates are that these are factor 2 more expensive than degenerate-degenerate.
- Optimization from Aranha, Beuchat, Detrey, Estibals give factor 1.7 advantage to genus 2 degenerate-degenerate vs EC.

So, genus-2 not exactly compelling for speed in this example.

Genus-2 looks stronger in [ABDE], in part due to 367-bit base field rather than 439-bit (elements fit in 3 rather than 4 128-bit registers).

- Pairing on degenerate divisors is factor 3 faster than pairing over $E(\mathbb{F}_{2^{1223}})$.

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